TULLY

OF

FRIENDSHIP.

LAELIUS:

OR A

DISCOURSE

UPON

FRIENDSHIP.

BY

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TRANSLATED FROM THE LATIN.

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I. QUINTUS MUCIUS the Augur, took many occaſions of launching out with a great readineſs of wit, mixt with a ſtrain of mirth, into the praiſe of C. Laelius, his father-in-law; and never ſcrupl'd to confer upon him the character of the Wiſe Laelius. Now as ſoon as I came to the years of diſcretion, I was by my father committed to the inſpection of Scaevola, and enjoyn'd to embrace all opportunities which might ſuit with his, or my own convenience, of being in the preſence of the good old man. As I had therefore ſeveral opportunities of laying up in my memory many points of learning, of which I had heard him debate with a great nicety of judgment; together with many ſhort and appoſite ſayings; I endeavoured to improve myſelf by the converſation of ſo prudent and learned a gentleman. Upon his death, I committed myſelf to the care of Scaevola the Pontifex; whom I dare aver to be as learned and juſt a man as any in the whole ſtate. But, to make no digreſſions upon the character of that gentleman, at preſent I ſhall confine my diſcourſe to the Augur. I particularly remember as he once ſate in

his great elbow-chair, (I, and two or three more of his friends being preſent) amongſt other topics, he fell into a diſcourſe that then happen'd to be the univerſal ſubject of converſation. You, Atticus, as being then intimately acquainted with Publius Sulpicius, muſt needs remember how extreamly the world was ſurprized at, and complained of the irreconcileable hatred that he (when Tribune of the people) profeſs'd againſt Quintus Pompey the Conſul, with whom he formerly lived in the ſtricteſt bonds of love and friendſhip. I ſay, Scaevola, having at that time accidentally fallen into that ſubject, from thence took an occaſion of relating to us Laelius's diſcourſe of friendſhip, which he held in the preſence of Scaevola himſelf, and of C. Fannius, Marcus's ſon (who was another of his ſons-in-law) a little after the death of Africanus; the ſum of that diſſertation I committed to my memory, and have here ſet it down according to my own fancy: for I have here introduc'd them ſpeaking in *propria perſona*, that I might not tire you with the frequent repetitions of *ſo*, and *ſays he*; and that the diſcourſe might ſeem directly to proceed from the mouth of the authors. A diſcourſe upon Friendſhip, is what you have very often begg'd of me: and indeed, as it is a ſubject that very well deſerves the notice and conſideration of mankind in general; ſo it particularly ſeems very appoſite to the familiarity and intimacy that is between us. Wherefore I am the more willingly induc'd to the undertaking, becauſe I am perſuaded I ſhall do ſome good to the public, at the ſame time I oblige my friend. As in my little treatiſe of Old Age, which is dedicated to yourſelf, I have intro-

duc'd old Cato arguing in its defence; becauſe I thought no man a more proper advocate for old age, than one who was ſo far advanc'd in it, and was ſo eminent, and ſo peculiarly a glory to it: ſo for the very ſame reaſon, being inform'd from the tradition of our anceſtors, how ſtrict, and intimate a familiarity there was between Caius Laelius and Publius Scipio, I have pitch'd upon Laelius as the moſt proper perſon to give you his own reflections and thoughts upon friendſhip, as Scaevola remembers to have heard them from his own mouth.

This ſort of writing by way of dialogue, when ſupported by the reputation and authority of ancient men, and them too, of the firſt character, hath ſomething ſo taking in it, and leaves ſo very deep an impreſſion, that in the peruſal of my own lines about Old Age, I can hardly perſuade myſelf, but that the thoughts and expreſſions are Cato's, and not my own. As then therefore the conſideration of your being yourſelf in years, induc'd me to lay that treatiſe of Old Age at your feet; ſo, upon a motive no leſs applicable, I have preſumed to prefix your name to this treatiſe of Friendſhip, and to beg your protection for the production of a man, to whom you are dear by the moſt ſacred ties of amity. In the former treatiſe you have the thoughts and reflections of Cato, a gentleman of as much learning, and as far advanc'd in years as any of thoſe times. In this latter you are entertained with a diſcourſe of the wiſe Laelius, that glorious and heroic pattern of pure and inviolable friendſhip. Let me beg you therefore to turn your thoughts a while from me, and imagine it is Laelius

himſelf that entertains you. Caius Fannius and Quintus Mucius come to pay their father a viſit, to comfort him upon the death of Africanus. They begin a diſcourſe upon friendſhip, which you will find in the reading, is the contents of the whole treatiſe; upon which head Laelius, at their requeſt, proceeds.

II. FANNIUS. We muſt all, ſir, acknowledge Africanus to have been a very eminent and deſerving perſon; but at the ſame time you ought not, out of too great a ſenſe of modeſty, to neglect your own merit; but to imagine the eyes of the whole world at preſent fixed upon yourſelf. 'Tis you alone, Sir, we univerſally diſtinguiſh by the name of the Wiſe Laelius; and you alone whom we really eſteem ſo.

Marcus Cato, it is true, was remarkable for the ſame character; and Lucius Attilius too, we are ſatisfied to have had the ſame diſtinction paid him by our anceſtors; but yet both were adorn'd with a character very different from yours. Attilius was eminently remarkable for his great judgment in the civil law: Cato bore the character of a great politician, and was look'd upon as a man throughly vers'd in the affairs of the world. From his prudent foreſight and management, both in the Senate and Forum; from his ſteady reſolution in acting, and from his weighty and pithy arguments, proceeded that great deference that was paid him by all mankind; tho' not before he was far advanced in years neither. But your character is of a higher ſtrain: 'tis not only your natural genius, and probity of manners, but your indefatigable ſtudy, and eminent learning that hath made you ſo conſpicuous

(not only among the common people, but men of letters too) for a wiſdom no way inferior to that of the Grecian Sages. Tho' as for thoſe ſeven who bore that character, they are reckoned by the critics not to deſerve the diſtinction. The Athenian indeed was univerſally eſteemed ſo, and had the atteſtation of the oracle for a confirmation of his character. But to us, your placing your happineſs within yourſelf, and making fortune ſubmit to the ſuperior force of virtue, appears a no leſs manifeſt proof of your exalted wiſdom. Wherefore the world enquires both of myſelf and Scaevola, how you deport yourſelf upon the death of Africanus; and particularly the more, becauſe upon the Nones of this laſt month, you were not preſent at the lecture held at D. Brutus's garden, tho' before you was the moſt exact man of the whole ſociety, in regard to time, and the moſt ready at the performance of that duty.

SCAEVOLA. I have often (as Fannius ſays) been asked the ſame queſtion; and always anſwered, that you ſeem'd to bear the loſs of ſo eminent a man, and ſo dear a friend, with abundance of calmneſs and moderation: Tho' indeed it would be impoſſible for a gentleman of your humane and generous diſpoſition, not to be ſenſibly affected at it. But as to your being abſent laſt lecture, I excuſed it, by attributing it to an indiſpoſition of body, rather than of mind. LAELIUS. Indeed, Scaevola, you were in the right: for whilſt in health, I will never ſo far give way to my own misfortunes, as to ſuffer them to withdraw me from the performance of thoſe functions which duty lays incumbent on me. Neither indeed, do I think any

excuſe to a man of a ſteady ſoul, a ſufficient plea for the neglect of his duty. As for you, Fannius, by honouring me with a character that I neither deſerve, nor aim at, you act indeed the part of a good friend; but in my opinion, you do not pay Cato the deference that is due to him: for I muſt own, I take Cato to have been a truly wiſe man, if (which I very much queſtion) there ever was one. To omit other inſtances, what greater proofs of wiſdom could he give, than that calm temper and reſignation with which he bore the loſs of his ſon? the deportment of Paulus and Gallus upon the like occaſion, is within my remembrance; but their children were but infants, their hopes were nipt in the very bud, before they could diſplay their beauties and perfections: and their misfortune therefore was not comparable to Cato's, who bemoan'd the death of a very hopeful and promiſing young gentleman. Wherefore in my opinion, gentlemen, you have very little reaſon to give even Socrates himſelf the preheminence: For Cato's character is owing to his practice; whereas the latter's is founded only on theory and ſpeculation.

III. As for my own particular, ſhould I deny my concern for the death of Scipio, the Stoics poſſibly might commend me: but really, my own conſcience will not ſuffer me: And I muſt own myſelf very ſenſibly afflicted for the loſs of ſuch a friend, as no man ever was, and, I dare affirm, ever will be bleſs'd with: but I am not without a remedy. This, amidſt all my afflictions, is ſtill my comfort, that I have not imbibed that error ſo prevalent amongſt friends, which

wracks them with ſuch cruel torments at their departure. For in my opinion, Scipio's fate is not deplorable; and it is I alone, if any body, deſerves your compaſſion: but grief, when conceived for our own misfortunes, ſeems to proceed from a principle of ſelf-love, rather than a principle of friendſhip. Who can deny, but that Scipio was well dealt with: for unleſs immortality, which he never aſpired to, had been added to the honours that had been conferred upon him, what was there that a mortal man dare hope for, which he did not obtain? Thoſe early hopes which in his childhood the world conceiv'd of him, fell infinitely ſhort of that merit, and thoſe qualifications which adorn'd his riper years. Twice he was inveſted with the conſular dignity, altho' he never ſu'd for it; the firſt time, before the cuſtomary age; the ſecond, within his due time, but almoſt too late to ſave the ſinking ſtate. By overthrowing two cities that were profeſs'd enemies and rivals to Imperial Rome, he not only put an end to the preſent war, but put it out of their power to raiſe new commotions for the future. His affable and gentle diſpoſition, his dutiful deportment to his mother, his generoſity to his ſiſters, his charitable and courteous behaviour to his friends, the juſtice that appear'd in all his actions, are virtues that ſhone forth in ſo bright a luſtre, that it is needleſs for me to inſiſt on them: and how ſerviceable and dear he was to the ſtate, thoſe ſhowers of tears that were ſhed at his funeral, are a ſufficient witneſs. The addition therefore of a few years would have been but of little ſervice to him: for ſuppoſing old age to ſit eaſie upon us, as I remember Cato aſſerted the year

before he died, in the preſence of my ſelf and Scipio, yet it damps our ſpirits, and cauſes that vigour and ſprightlineſs with which Scipio was endued, to decreaſe and flag. He had already therefore arriv'd to the higheſt pitch both of fortune and honour; and had he liv'd to the age of Neſtor, it would have been impoſſible for to have made any addition to them. And as for his death, the ſuddenneſs of it made him inſenſible of thoſe bitter pangs, and dreadful apprehenſions that generally attend us at our laſt gaſp. Such a ſort of death, in my mind, ſeems ſomething unaccountable, and you yourſelf are not ignorant of the conſtruction the world puts upon it. But this I dare affirm, that among all thoſe glorious and happy days which he ſaw, he never ſeem'd ſo eminently conſpicuous, nor ſhined forth with ſo great a luſtre, as he did the evening before he died, when upon the adjournment of the ſenate, he was attended to his houſe by the Patricians themſelves, as well as by the Latins and allies: For the honour and reſpect that was then paid him, ſeem'd rather to intimate his acceſſion to the heavenly throne, than his confinement to the ſhades below. For I own myſelf of a different opinion from ſome men, who have lately aſſerted the ſoul not to ſurvive, but after death to be utterly annihilated with the body.

IV. In my opinion, there is more deference to be paid to the authority and opinion of the ancient ſages, not only of our own country, but even of thoſe too, to whom Greece (that now indeed is ruin'd, tho' formerly ſo powerful and flouriſhing a nation) owed all its laws and inſtitutions; than to doubt the

immortality of the ſoul. For certainly they would never have paid ſo many rites and ceremonies to the dead, did they not think it a debt that was juſtly due to them. Socrates too (who, unleſs we deny the teſtimony of the oracle, we muſt all own to have been a man of a very exalted wiſdom) not only now and then, as the generality of mankind aſſerted their opinions, but at all times, and in all places, averr'd the ſoul of man to be of a divine nature, and that when it is once freed from the priſon of this mortal carcaſe, the road to heaven lies open to every juſt and good man: and Scipio likewiſe ſeem'd to run into the ſame opinion. If then the ſouls of good men, when once looſed from this clog of vile clay, flies to the bleſſed manſions of the Gods above, who can claim a juſter title to a ſeat among them, than Scipio. To grieve therefore at this accident, in my opinion, taſtes more of envy and ill nature, than real friendſhip. On the other hand, could we ſuppoſe the thinking faculty to be annihilated with our bodies, and our ſoul not to ſurvive the grave; yet even then, as we ſhould reap no benefit by dying, ſo we ſhall have no apprehenſion of evil from it, the difference only will be this, that he, to whom the city owes ſo many, and ſo great bleſſings, and whoſe birth we ought to ſolemnize with the greateſt marks of joy and gratitude (ſhould the thinking faculty periſh with the body) will himſelf be no more, but become like the child that is unborn. For Scipio therefore we have no reaſon to complain: I alone am the loſer; who, as I firſt made my appearance upon the ſtage of life, ought firſt to have made my exit. However, the dear remembrance of our friendſhip brings

this comfort along with it, that my life was ever happy, becauſe ever bleſs'd with the company of Scipio: who ever bore a ſhare of all my private uneaſineſſes, and public troubles, and was my conſtant companion at home and abroad: and, what is the very quinteſſence of friendſhip, between us there was a perfect harmony in all our ſtudies, thoughts, and actions. For my own part therefore, I am infinitely better pleaſed with the hopes of having the memory of our friendſhip perpetuated to poſterity, than with all thoſe marks and diſtinctions which Fannius ſays, the world confers upon me tho' undeſervedly; and I am better ſatisfied, becauſe there never yet have been above three or four pair of friends remarkable for their truth and ſincerity; in which roll, I hope, poſterity will find the names of Scipio and Laelius inſerted. FANNIUS. That, Sir, there is no doubt of: but ſince you have mentioned friendſhip, you will infinitely oblige me, and, I believe, Scaevola too, if, as you are uſed to do upon other topics, you pleaſe to divert a leiſure hour or two in entertaining us with your thoughts of friendſhip, wherein you think it conſiſts, what methods you judge moſt neceſſary for the attaining, and what cement is the moſt proper for the preſervation of it? SCAEVOLA. Upon my word, Sir, I ſhall take it as a very particular favour, and indeed had not Fannius prevented me, I was going to beg the ſame requeſt of you, which we now jointly deſire you to oblige us in.

V. LAELIUS. Was my power, gentlemen, equal to my will, I ſhould very readily comply with your re-

queſt; for it is a ſubject very well worth our conſideration, and as Fannius ſays, we have a leiſure hour or two to ſpare; but really, gentlemen, my abilities are not capable of ſo great a task; it is from ſuch learned heads as the antient Grecians, that we muſt expect extempore diſcourſes. This is an undertaking of great difficulty, and requires no little practice: wherefore I muſt refer you to have your deſires fulfilled by thoſe gentlemen who make ſuch things their buſineſs; for all that I can pretend to, is only to adviſe you, above all earthly bleſſings, to give the preference to friendſhip, which, in my mind, is the only good that can make affluence and proſperity agreeable, or render a turn of fate tolerably eaſy to us. But then I take it for granted, that only good men can enjoy this bleſſing, and that virtue is the proper cement of it; tho' I ſhall not ſearch ſo far to the bottom of it as thoſe men do, whoſe diviſions on this ſubject are more curious, their diſtinctions nicer, and perhaps truer too, tho' not ſo well adapted to common uſe; for they aſſert the wiſe man to be the only good man; which we would allow, would they not wind that wiſdom up to a higher pitch, than is poſſible for mortal man to attain to: whereas we ought to have regard, not to the vain chimaeras, which extravagant people either feign or wiſh for; but to thoſe things which are ſerviceable in common way of life; C. Fabritius, M. Curio, T. Coruncanius, were perſons whom our anceſtors adorn'd with the character of the wiſe; but had they been examin'd by the rule of thoſe nicer gentlemen, they would never have been thought worthy of that diſtinction. Let them therefore keep to themſelves that odious title

which they ſo much brag of, though ſo little underſtand; provided they will allow the formentioned gentlemen a place among the claſs of good men. But even that they refuſe, affirming it an honour which the wiſe alone have claim to. We therefore muſt be contented to affirm in the groſs, that thoſe men whoſe lives and morals are a proof of their faith, integrity, impartiality and liberality; whoſe virtues are not corrupted with the ſeeds of covetouſneſs, luſt, or raſhneſs; and who are as equally eminent for their ſteadineſs and reſolution, as thoſe men whom we have juſt nam'd; theſe gentlemen, I ſay, ſince they follow, (as much as frail fleſh and blood can) and are ſubſervient to the dictates of wiſe nature, that true and only guide to happineſs, as they are reckoned among the rank of good men, ſo ought they to have the deference paid them that is due to ſo bright a character. For I really am perſuaded that we are all born to converſe, and have ſociety one with another; and the nearer we are allied to each other, the ſtricter ought the community to be: hence it is that fellow-citizens ought to be preferr'd to foreigners, neighbours and relations to ſtrangers; with theſe nature herſelf directs us to contract a friendſhip, tho' the cements of it are not the moſt laſting. In one point therefore, friendſhip is to be preferr'd to affinity and kindred; for love and benevolence often flag, and wax cold among relations; when on the other hand they are the only cement that unites friends, and the loſs of them too great for friendſhip to ſurvive without them. But the excellence of friendſhip appears in nothing more, than that it is ſeparated from the general ſociety, which nature hath eſtabliſhed and confi-

ned within the narrow compaſs of two or three breaſts, united to one another by a mutual love and benevolence.

VI. The notion that I have of friendſhip, is this, that it is a perfect union, and agreement in thought, and diſpoſition, in things relating either to this world, or what's beyond it, joyn'd with the cement of mutual benevolence and good nature. Both the happineſs and advantage of friendſhip are ſo great, that (wiſdom excepted) I ſhould call it the firſt privilege and bleſſing, the gods have granted to human nature. The tendency of other mens fancies and judgments perhaps, may prompt them on to fix their eſteem and deference, either upon riches, or a good ſhare of health; others may give grandeur and power the prevalence; others faſten their minds upon title and equipage; and the generality of mankind upon pleaſure, the idol of ſenſe. As for pleaſure, the deſire of many, that's the advantage and happineſs of beings below reaſon; and the very nature of all the reſt is unconſtant and feeble, the ſlippery gifts of fortune, and beyond our power to keep. There are others (and thoſe but a very few) who make virtue the *ſummum bonum*, and deſervedly merit for their good choice: but then it is confeſſedly true, that virtue is the product and preſerver of friendſhip, both gives life to it, and preſerves its exiſtence. For friendſhip neither appears nor continues, where virtue is wanting; that virtue I mean, which appears in practice of life, and which does not conſiſt in the airy idea which School-men and Philoſophers entertain of it.

The Pauli, the Cato's, the Caii and Scipio's, and the Phili, we allow to be the good and great, in concert with the judgment and opinion of the world; yet not without their ſhares of frailty and miſcarriage. As for the perfect and infallible, we neither know them, nor have any thing to ſay to them. Among ſuch men as I have juſt mention'd, the conveniencies and good of friendſhip, are not to be deſcribed by the invention of words. For, in the firſt place, as Ennius has admirably ſaid, Who in human nature cannot ſay he is happy in the poſſeſſion of a ſincere friend? for what can be a greater pleaſure, than for a man without miſtruſt or reſerve, to let his friend have a paſſage into his ſoul, and he is as ſafe and ſecure, as if no body was conſcious to his thoughts? where would be the reliſh and taſte in affluence and a good eſtate, if we wanted a friend to rejoyce and partake with us? and what an inſupportable load wou'd want and affliction be, but for the bleſſing of friendſhip? that ſoftener of cares, a comfort and eaſe to all the miſeries that we are ſubject to: how heavy ſhould we drag on without it, and how is the burthen alleviated by it? but, in fine, there is nothing which either we purſue or aim at, but has its proper and particular uſe and advantage; now, riches are proper for actions of generoſity and benevolence; grandeur and power, procure obeiſance and attendance: titles, honour and reſpect among people; pleaſures are for the gratification of ſenſe and appetite; health, to live at eaſe, and free from the diſturbance of pain, and withal to be in a capacity to perform the neceſſary functions of life, and to diſcharge the buſineſs of this world. But the uſe and

good of friendſhip is not confined, or tied down to this or that particular advantage; it anſwers every ſtate and condition of life, and there is no one virtuous ſcene of action, but wherein it is proper; and we are at a loſs to fix the time, when it is unſeaſonable, or unpleaſant. In a word, friendſhip is as neceſſary, and as many ways ſerviceable to our being, as the air to breathe in, or thoſe elements of fire and water, which we cannot be ſupported without. Miſtake me not, I am not deſcribing that outward and ſhallow part of friendſhip which perhaps may pleaſe, and have its advantages too; but I am diſcourſing and ſpeaking of the nature and conſtitution of perfect and ingenuous friendſhip, which is practiſed and entertained but by an inconſiderable part of the world. For proſperity, from the influence of friendſhip, ſhines brighter; and even the calamities of life become tolerable by the benefit and aſſiſtance of it.

VII. And ſince there ariſe, from the benefit of friendſhip, conveniencies that are not only numerous, but in their natures very valuable alſo; I take this not to be the leaſt which gives hopes to our expectations, and is an antidote to deſpair, and weakneſs of mind. But beſides, friendſhip is like a looking glaſs, which every time we view it, gives us a repreſentation of our very ſelves: wherefore we can fancy our ſelves in the preſence of our friends, tho' we are many miles aſunder: ſtill ſeem to enjoy affluence and proſperity, tho' in the midſt of want; and a perfect health, tho' we lie languiſhing upon a ſick-bed; and what is more incredible ſtill, after we are laid in our graves,

we continue to live, at leaſt ſo far as our memory is dear to our ſurviving friends, and the loſs of us is ever in their thoughts. Upon which account the death of the deceaſed is termed happy and glorious, and the ſurvivor, ever reſpected and honoured. Now, to reflect a little, if the ties of good-nature, humanity, and reciprocal kindneſs, be once torn aſunder and diſjoined, ſociety and commerce are at an end; neither families, nor commonwealths can continue when they are diſſolved. And that we may not want conviction, or being informed of the value and dignity of friendſhip, the evil and uneaſineſs of diſcord and contention ſatisfie us how deſirable it is. Moreover, to inſtance in matters of fact, and thereby to illuſtrate the advantage and good of mutual benevolence: how are families ſhatter'd and beggar'd by diſſention? how are kingdoms and popular communities turn'd into wilds and deſarts by ravage and diſcord? this is a torrent too ſtrong to be oppos'd, and turns all things from their very foundation, by their violence of nature. We are informed, that a certain Agregentine, a man of good letters, has in his works laid it down as a truth and axiom, that union and agreement in nature preſerve and ſave; but that diviſion and antipathy efface and deſtroy: and there is ſcarce a man in the world of any judgment and rational reflexion, but without ſcruple will run in with the truth of the aſſertion. Upon this ſcore it is, that whenever friendſhip leads a man on to the expoſing himſelf for the man he loves, or to the ſharing a common danger, that every one is ready to commend and applaud the action. How loud were the acclamations of the the-

atre in favour of my very good friend and companion, Marcus Pacuvius, at the firſt night of his play, when the king was in doubt, which repreſented Oreſtes. Pylades had fixed his reſolution to paſs for the man, and was willing to be ſacrificed himſelf, that he might preſerve his friend. Oreſtes, on the other hand, endeavoured to ſatisfie the auditory, by all the arguments of truth, that himſelf was the perſon, and ought to die. And though this in reality was nothing but fiction and ſhow, and yet was attended with ſuch mighty applauſe; what may we imagine would have been the approbation they wou'd have given to fact? even here we find the paſſions were raiſed, and nature very greatly diſcover'd herſelf, when a bare ſcene of action commanded the applauſe and commendations of men, in a thing they confeſs'd, merited very much, though themſelves were not very forward to put it in practice. I have thus far in general deliver'd my ſelf upon the ſcore of friendſhip, and if there are points relating to it left untouched, (as I am apt to imagine there are many) it will better anſwer your expectations to be ſatisfied from thoſe, who underſtand more of thoſe things, and whoſe buſineſs lies that way. FAN. It will, Sir, be much more to our ſatisfaction to receive it from you. I muſt confeſs too, that frequently I have been importunate with many about this ſubject, and have heard it with attention and pleaſure; but there is ſomething ſo pleaſing and agreeably taking in your expreſſion, that—— SCAEV. What then wou'd have been your thoughts and ſentiments, if you had been preſent in Scipio's garden, when the ſubject in diſpute was about

the nature and conſtitution of government? how ſtrenuouſly did he aſſert, and handſomely defend the cauſe of juſtice, againſt all the ſubtilties and cunning of Philus. FAN. Is it a wonder that a perſon of truth and integrity ſhou'd zealouſly defend an argument of that nature? SCAEV. And can that man be at a loſs for words and arguments to deliver himſelf upon the nature of friendſhip, who with glory and reputation has adorn'd himſelf with the diſtinguiſhing character of a ſincere friend?

VIII. LAEL. This, gentlemen, is compulſion with a witneſs, and had you uſed other perſwaſions and arguments, you'd have carry'd your point; for whether I reflect upon the quality of the perſons that demand my judgment, or the nature of the thing deſired, there is enough in either to prevent my ſilence, or my not anſwering your requeſt: to purſue therefore the buſineſs of your demand, on my conſtant and frequent meditation on friendſhip, this thing ſeem'd not to be the leaſt worthy of my thought and conſideration; Whether friendſhip is deſired and wiſhed for upon the ſcore of our wants and inſufficiencies, and that alſo by an interchange of mutual benevolence, we may have an opportunity to give and receive; which cannot ſo well be effected without a friendly correſpondence. I ſay, it is a matter of diſpute and queſtion, whether this be the chief conſideration of friendſhip. But to me it ſeems to proceed from a more natural and noble cauſe. It is love, the very being and ſoul of friendſhip, that is the principle of union, and the foundation of good-nature. Now counterfeit and

flattery may ſerve a turn, and gain the ſycophant's ends: but in true friendſhip there is nothing of feint or the flatterer: for the nature of it is to be genuine and ſincere, and then this is conviction enough to the world, that friendſhip rather ſeems to take its riſe and ſpring from our natures, than owe its birth to a ſenſe of want and indigence. I ſay, 'tis rather from the inclination of our deſires, and the wiſh of our ſoul to be united to the perſon we love, than from that meanneſs of thought, which only propoſes an end and advantage by it. Even the brutal and irrational world are neither void nor deſtitute of it: the particular regard that brutes have for their young, while incapacitated to ſhift for themſelves; the reciprocal kindneſs and affection that appears in their young, is a manifeſt indication that they have it wove into their very nature: but inſtances of it ſtill appear greater, and ſhow themſelves more nobly in human nature: and, firſt, it appears and diſplays itſelf in the love and indulgent affection of parents to their children, and in that of children to their parents back again, which neither are wanting in the one, refuſed or violated in the other, without the blackeſt guilt or higheſt deformity. In the next place, we have the ſame paſſion and degree of love when we have found out the man that is very like us, ſo as whenever we take a view of him, he reflects back the very picture of us. For, there is nothing more amiable than virtue, there's nothing that either attracts or charms ſo powerfully. And this is both a common and prevailing reaſon with us, to unite our affections to perſons of ſincere probity and good manners, though our acquaintance with them is

no other than what we have heard of them. And to inſtance, to whom is not the name and memory of Fabricius and Marcus Curius dear and grateful, tho' he never ſaw them? and where is the man that will not ſhow his diſguſt and hatred to the bare mentioning of Tarquin, Spurius Caſſius, and Maelius, alſo to Pyrrhus and Hannibal, generals of courage and valour, and rivals to the greatneſs and grandeur of Rome? indeed, Pyrrhus, though an enemy, had our reſpect and good word, becauſe he had probity and generoſity in him. But Hannibal was the deteſtation and odium of Rome for his inhuman behaviour, and barbarity of temper.

IX. Now if the charms of generoſity and actions of probity be ſo powerful over us, that not only we have a value and eſteem for perſons endued therewith, tho' we are ſtrangers to them; and, what's more remarkable, a generous enemy ſhall not be without his ſhare of our reſpect. Is it ſtrange, or at all to be wonder'd at, that our affections ſhou'd unite nearer, and our paſſions be more powerfully raiſed, for the acquaintance and friendſhip of thoſe perſons in whom we find actions of worth and dignity, and with whom we may fix our correſpondence? wherever ſympathy of affection is fix'd and confirmed by all thoſe ſteps and means, that were conducive to the eſtabliſhing mutual love, gratitude and benevolence will appear in the higheſt inſtances of zealous friendſhip; which, were we to ſuppoſe to have its birth from a ſenſe of our weakneſs, and be eſtabliſhed upon the hopes of a ſurer aſſiſtance in the obtaining our deſires, we muſt

make friendſhip take its riſe from a very baſe and mean principle; and ground it upon the falſe foundation of want and indigence. And did the caſe ſtand thus, the narrower a man's circumſtances were, and the leſs competent his fortune for his ſupport, ſo much the better wou'd he be capable to begin, entertain, and carry on the buſineſs of friendſhip. But this is altogether miſtake and error: for the man who is well to paſs in the world, who by a provident foreſight, and neceſſary care, has armed himſelf againſt chance and diſappointment, and has ſufficient of what he may call properly his own, to ſet him beyond the circumſtances of dependance, is, without doubt, beſt qualified for the purpoſes and maintaining of friendſhip. Was Scipio indigent, poor, or mean, that he was obliged to make uſe of me? or was my fortune ſo ſtrait, as to throw me upon a dependance of him? it was far different in relation to us both; it was his virtue, and other good qualities of mind that wrought my ſoul into an admiration of his perſon: and they were no ill accompliſhments that gave him an affection for me, and that prevail'd with him to entertain me as a friend; which converſation and opportunity improved to the beſt purpoſes and ends of friendſhip. Altho' from our correſpondence and good-fellowſhip, there follow'd many advantages and ſervices to each other, yet our affections were not rais'd or founded upon the hopes of this. As alſo our actions of generoſity and benevolence, proceed from a natural propenſity and deſire in our natures to be ſerviceable to mankind, rather than from the motive and inducement of getting into the good gra-

ces of the world (for civility and liberality are not lent upon uſury): ſo we unite into the bonds of friendſhip, not from a proſpect of intereſt, or with mercenary ſouls, but think it amiable and worth our purſuit, from the recompence the pleaſure of loving rewards us with. As for thoſe whoſe ſentiments run in with the animal world, and have nothing in deſign or view but their pleaſure, we ſhake hands with them, and retire from their company. And there is no room for wonder or ſurprize, if we do ſo, for there their thoughts and very ſouls are taken up and devoted to objects that are vile and mean; and they neither perceive, nor reliſh any thing that has worth in its nature, or what's beyond the pleaſure of ſenſe and appetite; and then, for a very good reaſon, we diſmiſs them from being any concern of ours; but then we take it for granted, that whenever virtue and probity ſhine forth with any luſtre, it is natural for us to ſhew a love and eſteem for the perſons that are adorn'd with it: for when we are once touched with a tenderneſs and reſpect for ſuch qualities, we of conſequence endeavour to ingratiate our ſelves with the perſon whom we have fix'd in our favour, and take all poſſible occaſions of improving by his company and converſation; ſo that at laſt we may arrive to a pitch of mutual love, and each of us more ready to beſtow a favour, than expect any thing by the bargain; ſuch an emulation wou'd not only be glorious, but render friendſhip very advantageous too; and it is a ſure ſign that its original proceeds from nature, and not from our own infirmities: for were friendſhip to be founded upon the baſis of intereſt, as that fail'd, the ſuper-

ſtructure muſt naturally totter; but, becauſe nature is ever immutable and conſtant to itſelf; friendſhip, of conſequence, when proceeding from that ſource, muſt be firm and laſting. Thus, gentlemen, you ſee, we have traced friendſhip to its original, tho' I doubt, you are too much tired with this, than to deſire my farther thoughts on this head. FAN. Pray, Laelius, go on; for as he is the younger, I dare anſwer for him. SCAEV. I readily conſent to Fannius's requeſt; wherefore, pray, Sir, proceed.

X. LAEL. I am very ready, gentlemen, to lay before you the thoughts and ſentiments, Scipio and my ſelf had about friendſhip, and which in our converſation was frequently the ſubject of diſcourſe. Now it was a notion of his, that nothing was equally ſtrange, or ſo uncommon, as friendſhip carried on without interruption till death hath ſeparated the friends themſelves. For it frequently happens, that what's a pleaſure to one, is a diſtaſte to another; ſometimes the notions of government and ſtate-affairs are different. Moreover, he uſed to ſay, that he frequently found true from obſervation, that a turn of fortune, or the incumbrance of old age changed the ſoul, and altered the diſpoſition of the mind. He began his obſervation from the example of children, who playfellows, and much of an age would unite and ſympathize in all their affections, but drew back into coldneſs and indifferency when they began to look towards manhood; yet let it be ſuppoſed it grew up with them longer, and they continued in a fair correſpondence till they could write man; then they were com-

monly divided and ſeparated by accidents and occaſions that fell in their way; perhaps a miſtreſs, a wife, or their pleaſure, or ſomething they both paſſionately valued, and yet but one cou'd be the better for: were their advances carried on farther, and no accident yet had given occaſion for a breach, it is common to divide and fall off when they become candidates for a court favour, and are competitors for a title and name of honour. And really, what greater bane of friendſhip, or ruin of benevolence ſhows its ſelf in the world, than the general deſire of ſerving our ſelves, and regarding nothing but our own intereſt? a deſire and ſtruggle for greatneſs and honour, have not only diſſolved the ſtricteſt alliances and friendſhip, but have turned them into odiums and deteſtations; ſo that from being the beſt of friends, men are often changed into the worſt of enemies. But farther, there are other cauſes that give interruption to friendſhip, and are the effects of diſcord and diviſion, which I think unblameable; that is, when the demands of either are unreaſonable and guilty; when modeſty or honeſty muſt be ſacrificed to ſerve their lewd and treacherous purpoſes. Now, the man who is ſo honeſt and juſt, as to diſſent and flie off upon this account, is condemned as guilty of the breach of friendſhip, by thoſe he in conſcience and equity could not joyn with, and therefore refuſed his compliance: but thoſe ſort of men ſay, they give aſſurances from their demands, that they are willing to wade through all things, and ſtop at nothing to ſerve their friends. This quarrel, and frivolous complaint of theirs, not

only puts a ſtop to, and extinguiſhes familiarity and freedom of addreſs; but gives birth to eternal reſentments and animoſities: and, in fine, it was the opinion of Scipio, that a perſon was not only prudent and wiſe, but might reckon himſelf particulary happy, if he could ſteer free, and keep clear of thoſe occaſions of interruptions which, like ſo many rocks, make the voyage hazardous.

XI. If you pleaſe therefore, gentlemen, I ſhall firſt make an inquiry, to find out, How far love is a neceſſary ingredient to friendſhip. Now, to illuſtrate a little: was it neceſſary, that the friends of Coriolanus, and perſons of his acquaintance, ſhou'd be rebels in complaiſance to him, and ravage their country for to pleaſure their correſpondent? and in like manner, was it an obligation, by being the friends of Viſcelinus and S. Maelius, that they muſt run in with their villainous and baſe deſigns, to ſeize the reins of government, and uſurp the command of the empire? but contrary to this, we find, that friendſhip and acquaintance were not able to prevail with Quintus Tubero; or many others of the familiars of T. Gracchus to ſtand by him when he inflamed the common-wealth, and mutinied againſt the ſtate: and C. Bloſius of Cuma, a gueſt, and acquaintance of your relations, Scaevola, petitioning me (who then was one of the committee, with Laenatus and Rupilius the conſuls, about buſineſs of the public) to ſtand his friend, and bring him off, gave in this as a reaſon; that T. Gracchus was ſo intimate and dear to him, that he thought himſelf bound, and obliged to perform, and

proſecute whatever his friend would have him do. Very good, ſaid I, and if T. Gracchus had enjoyned you to have fired the Capitol, you willingly would have taken it upon you, and executed it accordingly? my friend, ſays he, wou'd never have entertained a thought of that nature. Well, but imagine he might have demanded it of you: why then, ſays he, I muſt have complied, and ſhould have done it accordingly. Ye behold, my friends, what a villainous confeſſion here is of his own; and he was not only as good as his word, but his after-actions have demonſtrated, that his intentions were worſe than he ſaid. The preſumption and raſhneſs of Gracchus he did not follow, but out-ſtrip; he did not joyn, nor go along with him in his fury againſt the commonwealth, but was a leader himſelf, and the chief incendiary: but being apprehenſive of a new impeachment, he retired into Aſia, and joyn'd with the common enemy; and at laſt, was rewarded as a traytor and rebel to the commonwealth. To offend and be guilty, upon the ſcore of friendſhip, is neither excuſe nor mitigation of the crime. It has already been laid down for truth, That virtue and friendſhip are inſeparable; and then, if virtue be diſregarded, friendſhip muſt ceaſe of courſe. If therefore, our definitions are right, we ſhall find the higheſt pitch of wiſdom to conſiſt in a mutual readineſs of obliging our friends, where the demands do not interfere with juſtice: for, you muſt know, we at preſent confine ourſelves to ſuch a ſort of friends, as we have either ſeen, or heard of in our converſe with the world. From friends of this rank and quality we ſhou'd take our example; and even from theſe

who are remarkably eminent for wiſdom and prudence; who have deliver'd down to us, by the records of fame, that P. Aemilius, and C. Luſcinus, were very familiar and friendly. They were more than once honour'd together with the high dignity of the Conſulate, and were twice united in the office of the Cenſors. Tradition has informed us alſo, that M. Curius, and T. Coruncanius, were not only intimate and familiar with theſe perſons; but maintain'd alſo a ſtrict friendſhip, and kept a very good correſpondence between themſelves; and yet, there was no room for ſuſpicion, that any of their demands upon their friend were diſagreeable to honeſty, the duties of conſcience, or the obligations they had to be true to the ſtate. It is entirely foreign, and contrary to the character of thoſe great men, to imagine any thing of that nature: but ſuppoſe there might have been a knave among them; yet I am aſſured his attempts upon the reſt would have been vain, and that his expectation would never have been anſwer'd by men of the greateſt integrity and honour: for either to demand or practiſe any thing villainous or unjuſtifiable, created, and raiſed the very ſame degrees of abhorrence among them: but yet, C. Carbo and C. Cato, and his brother Caius, followed the ſteps of Titus Gracchus; the latter indeed, did not ſhow any great inclination to it at the beginning; tho' at the laſt he was as active as any of them.

XII. This then, ought to be a firm and unalterable law in friendſhip, that we never propoſe what's vicious or criminal, or give way to the deſires of our

friend, whenever they bear that ſtamp and character: For, it is fooliſh and ridiculous to plead not guilty, to actions of diſhoneſty and ill fame; (but much more ſo, when they tend to imbroil the ſtate, and will be deſtructive to the government) becauſe the humour of a friend requires us to gratifie him: as for us, gentlemen, we are placed in a higher ſtation than ordinary, from whence we ought to look down with circumſpection, that we may be able to foreſee the further dangers that may threaten the ſtate; for the way of the world is ſtrangely perverted, and the cuſtom of our anceſtors turned from their wonted courſe. Titus Gracchus's aim and endeavour was, to be abſolute in power and command, without controul; and accordingly he had, for a ſhort ſpace of time, the reins of government in his own hands: this was an uſurpation new and ſtrange to the people of Rome; and what were the conſequences of it, may be ſeen by the ſhare of ill uſage that Scipio, after the death of that man, met with from his friends; and really, it is a very melancholy ſtory to reflect on: for our hands had been juſt embrewed in the blood of Tiberius Gracchus, and, upon that account, we calmly ſuffer'd Carbo, his accomplice, and partner in villany, to eſcape ſcot free. Now, Caius Gracchus is inveſted with the Tribuneſhip, and what we muſt expect from the ambition of his factious ſoul, is hard to determine: however, I am apprehenſive, leſt the ſpreading contagion ſhou'd take root, and when once fix'd, overrun the whole ſoil; of which, what greater inſtances can we have, than the fatal conſequences that attended firſt the Gabinian law, and two years after, the Caſſi-

an. In ſhort, methinks, I have the proſpect of a diſunion between the Senate and people, and an apprehenſion, leſt the popularity ſhou'd carry all things before them; for the generality of the people ſeem rather to foment and raiſe ſedition, than contrive how to ſtop and appeaſe the torrent of faction. Theſe inſtances therefore, may ſerve to ſhew us, that no body would ever undertake ſuch dangerous deſigns, was he not encouraged to it by the hopes of meeting friends and accomplices. Wherefore, we muſt give good men this caution, that if ever they have the ill luck to fall into ſuch acquaintance, they ſhould not think the ties of friendſhip ſo binding, as to compel them, in defence of their friends, to harbour any treacherous deſigns againſt the ſtate; for there are laws eſtabliſh'd for the puniſhment of offenders, which are as rigorous againſt the abetters and inſtruments, as againſt the authors and ring-leaders of the faction. Themiſtocles was a great and powerful general, as ever appear'd at the head of a Grecian army: in the war with the Perſians, he utterly defeated them, and made Greece owe its liberty to the power of his victorious arm. The envy that enſued this glorious action, cauſed him to be baniſh'd his country. He knew he ought, and accordingly endeavour'd to put up the injury, but his reſentment ran too high, to forgive his ungrateful country: and, as Coriolanus did, about twenty years ago, he was reſolved to revenge the affront. Neither one, nor the other, found any man that wou'd ſacrifice his country to the reſentment of his friend; but deſpairing of ſucceſs, they grew deſperate, and fell upon their own ſwords, that they might not

ſurvive the diſappointment. Wherefore, the agreement of wicked men ought not to be palliated under the excuſe of friendſhip, but rather be expoſed to the rigour of the law; to let every man know, that friendſhip gives him no priviledge of ruining his country: tho' indeed, as affairs go now, I ſee little probability of its coming to paſs. However, I wou'd be no leſs ſolicitous for the preſervation of the ſtate, when I am in the grave, than now, whilſt I am one of its members.

XIII. To ask nothing of our friends but what is juſt and honourable; not to with-hold our hands till they ask our aſſiſtance, but to be always, and on all occaſions, ready to oblige them; freely to give them our advice; to be biaſſed in our actions by their authority and judgment; to exhort and admoniſh them, not only openly, but ſharply too, upon occaſion, and to ſubject our ſelves to their more prudent exhortations, are rules which ought to be laid down as the very foundation to all friendſhip. There are a parcel of paradoxes in great favour with the Grecian ſages, that I think, are ſomething very ſingular and uncommon: tho' indeed, what is there, that by their quirks and ſubtilties they cannot make plauſible: a man ought not (ſay they) to contract a friendſhip with too many, leſt the weight of the whole ſhou'd lie upon his own ſhoulders; for every man hath enough to do to mind his own concerns, without embarraſſing himſelf with the affairs of his neighbours: it is the ſafeſt way therefore, not to knit the bands of friendſhip ſo tight, but that we may looſen, or contract them, as it ſuits with

our convenience; for the true baſis of a happy life, is founded upon our own ſecurity: but it is impoſſible for the mind of man to enjoy that bleſſing, or be free from anxiety and trouble, who bears the weight of ſo many peoples burdens. Others there are, who give friendſhip a more uncourteous treatment; and, as I have briefly hinted, adviſe us to diſcard love and benevolence, and fix our friendſhip upon the firmer baſis (as they term it) of profit and convenience; ſo that the leſs ſtrength and abilities a man hath to ſtem the over-bearing current of ill fortune, the more friends he ſhou'd make, and, in their aſſiſtance, ſeek that defence which he himſelf is not arm'd with: hence it is that women endeavour to protect themſelves under the bulwark of friendſhip, with more application than men; the oppreſſed than the powerful, and thoſe that are overwhelmed with waves of adverſity, rather than thoſe which enjoy the calms of proſperity. This is a piece of policy, for which they are ever to be envied and applauded; and they might pluck the ſun out of the firmament, with as little prejudice to mankind, as deprive us of friendſhip, which is the greateſt bleſſing the Gods have beſtow'd upon us. For, as for that ſecurity, which is founded on the bottom of ſelf-intereſt, it only carries with it a fair outſide, but is not always to be depended on; neither is it reaſonable to avoid the undertaking, or deſiſt from the proſecution of an honourable action, merely becauſe fatigue and trouble attend it. If we once have ſuch an averſion to trouble and uneaſineſs; why do we not lay aſide all pretences to virtue too, of which we give evident proofs, when by our care and concern, we ſhow a diſ-

like and averſion to thoſe things which are directly contrary to it? Thus, honeſty takes a diſtaſte and antipathy againſt knavery, temperance againſt ſenſuality, and bravery againſt cowardice. And accordingly, we ſee a man of an upright mind, to have an utter abhorrence to all unjuſt dealings; nothing to be more hateful to, and beneath a man of courage, than timorouſneſs and cowardice; nothing more ſhocking to the modeſt man, than lewdneſs and debauchery. This therefore is peculiar to a mind well diſpoſed, not only to be pleaſed with thoſe things which tend to the advancing of virtue, but to be ſenſibly affected with the contrary. Since therefore trouble and uneaſineſs ſometimes ruffles and diſorders the wiſe man's breaſt, and will ever work the ſame effect upon him, unleſs we cou'd ſuppoſe him diveſted of thoſe paſſions, and affections to which our frail nature is expoſed: what warrantable grounds can we have for utterly extirpating, and baniſhing friendſhip from common ſociety, becauſe trouble and concern may poſſibly ſometimes attend it? for, was the mind inſenſible of thoſe affections, we ſhould be but a very few degrees ſuperior, not only to brutes, but even to ſtocks and ſtones. Were ſome people to have the bearing, we ſhou'd have reaſon to believe virtue to be ſomething very crabbed and hard to be digeſted; when on the contrary, in all reſpects, and particularly in caſes of friendſhip, ſhe ſeems to be of a very condeſcending and tractable diſpoſition: from whence it is, that ſympathizing with the fortune of our friends, we are chearful and tranſported at their proſperity, but upon a turn of fate, our brow is ruffled, and our joy

contracted with their fortune. Wherefore, as I ſaid before, we have no more reaſon to diſcard friendſhip, becauſe it ſometimes lays upon our own ſhoulders the burthen of our friend, than we have to ſhake hands with virtue, becauſe care and trouble help to make up her retinue.

XIV. But friendſhip, when once contracted (as I have ſaid before), if there appear any ſparks of virtue to which the mind, by a conformity to its excellencies, may be united, muſt of neceſſity ſpring and ſhoot up into a mutual love: for how abſurd is it to be pleaſed with ſuch vanity and trifles, as honour, wealth, glory, fine houſes, ornaments, &c. yet be neither charm'd nor touch'd with the beauties of a virtuous mind, tho' indued with ſo many qualifications both of receiving, and exciting love; eſpecially when there is ſo great a ſatisfaction placed in the acknowledgement, and recompence of paſt favours, and in the mutual return of obligations and good offices. To which we may add another conſideration of no ſmall weight; namely, there is no cauſe ſo powerful in the producing of its effects, as reſemblance and conformity in mind and manners, is to create friendſhip. Conformable to which, we ſee good men to have a natural tendency, and reſpect one for the other; and from the natural likeneſs in their temper aſſociate together as friends and kinſmen; for nothing gives greater proof of its tendency and love for ſimilar qualities, than nature. This therefore, gentlemen, I think very plain, that there is a neceſſary tie of love and benevolence between good men; which I take to be by

nature conſtituted as the very fountain and foundation from whence all the ſprings of friendſhip proceed, and upon which it is built: neither is this love and benevolence confined to narrow bounds, but generouſly diffuſes it ſelf thro' all mankind: for virtue exempts its ſelf from none, is ever courteous and condeſcending; the wiſeſt counſellor, and ſafeſt guard to ſave whole ſtates from ruin: which qualities ſhe cou'd never be endued with, had ſhe any averſion for the embraces of the meaner ſort: they therefore, that place advantage and profit, as the ſupport of friendſhip, ſeem to me to take away the moſt agreeable part, and ſureſt cement of it: for, the love and good-will of our friend, is infinitely to be preferr'd before the advantage and convenience we receive from him; for, it is his endeavour and intentions that give ſeaſon to the action, and render the performance of it welcome and agreeable. The neceſſity therefore we lie under, of being obliged to our neighbours, is ſo far from being the original of friendſhip, that its rays ſhine out with greater luſtre in none, than in thoſe whoſe minds are adorned with virtue, and their fortune guarded from the ſtrokes of adverſity, by affluence and wealth. I cannot indeed ſay, but that it is ſometimes neceſſary that we ſhou'd ſtand in need of our friends aſſiſtance; for what progreſs could we have made either in our ſtudies, or knowledge of our affections, if Scipio had not ſometimes, either at home or abroad, ſtood in need of my aſſiſtance and advice? friendſhip is therefore not to be grounded upon the foundation of profit; but profit is rather a neceſſary emanation from it.

XV. We are therefore not to give a rich man the hearing, when he diſputes about friendſhip, which is not grounded upon reaſon and experience. For who is there that would ſo far reſign his repoſe and ſatisfaction to the gaudy vanity of affluence and proſperity, as to barter the love and good-will of his neighbours, for a little pelf and filthy lucre? The life of ſuch a man is not a whit preferable to that of the greateſt tyrant, who attended with a thouſand fears and ſuſpicions, hath ſhook hands with ſecurity and charity, and (without ſuppoſing love of ſo extenſive a quality, as to reach even thoſe we fear and ſuſpect) diſrobed himſelf of that guard and defence, which ariſes from a mutual confidence, and ſincere friendſhip. We often indeed ſee a ſhew of friendſhip put on for the ſerving ſome exigency, or carrying on ſome deſign; but if, in the mean time, as it ſometimes happens, that their affairs turn adverſe, they then may eaſily perceive what power intereſt hath upon mens affections, and what adorations were paid rather to the money, than the friend. This Tarquin ſurnamed the proud, ſeem'd to find too true, when in his baniſhment he ſaid he had ſounded the fidelity of his acquaintance; and when he could no longer flatter their hopes, nor reward their aſſiduity, he then could diſtinguiſh his friends from paraſites. Tho' indeed, ſo inſupportable, and ſo unreaſonable was his pride, that it were next kin to a miracle if he found any that were ſound at the bottom. But as unfit as the diſpoſition of that unhappy gentleman was, for the cultivation of friendſhip; yet we ſhall find the power and wealth of great men to be ſometimes as great a bar to the progreſs of it.

For dame fortune is not only blind herſelf, but infatuates and caſts a miſt before the eyes of her favourites, and, with the ſweet and agreeable draughts of wealth and honour, often mixes the bitter ingredients of arrogance and diſdain; and what can be more inſupportable than a rich and fortunate coxcomb? How many inſtances have we of gentlemen of a courteous and affable diſpoſition, growing giddy with their fortune; laying aſide thoſe commendable qualifications; ſuing for new friends, and from that height of power, and riches to which chance hath exalted them, looking down with ſcorn and contempt upon their old acquaintance. And what greater proof can they give of their folly than the pains they take to furniſh themſelves with thoſe gaudy ſuperfluities of equipage and ornaments, without any regard or concern for the cultivation of true friendſhip, that ineſtimable and neceſſary ingredient to a happy life. Theſe men take pains for they know not who, and labour for a tranſitory and precarious good; which perhaps, they in a ſhort time muſt yield up to the ſuperior force of ſome more powerful neighbour: Whereas, friendſhip is an eſtate for life, ſo ſure, agreeable and laſting a poſſeſſion, that were we for ever to enjoy thoſe ſlippery gifts of fortune; yet, was friendſhip excluded, our life would be a burthen to us.

XVI. But to proceed no farther in this, we muſt now determine, how far the bounds and limits of friendſhip ought to be extended. Concerning this point, there are three opinions; neither of which, in

my mind, are either true or honourable: the firſt is, that we ſhould have the ſame love and reſpect for our friends, as we pay to our ſelves: the ſecond is, that we ſhould meaſure our love to our friends, by the benevolence and affection they tender us: the third is, that we ought to pay the ſame deference, and to have the ſame regard for them, as they have for themſelves. Theſe are three opinions, with which, for my part, I can by no means be ſatisfied. The firſt of them muſt not be allowed of; for how many inſtances have we of mens actions, and accompliſhing (to oblige and ſerve their friends) things, which, for their own ſakes alone, they never would have undertaken. When we cringe and bow to a villain, in behalf of our friends; or when, in defending them from ſlander and calumny, we inveigh againſt their accuſers with more warmth than ordinary; ſuch inſtances carry with them tokens of a noble and generous temper, when done to ſerve our friends; tho' were they to proceed from a concern for our ſelves, they would have a very different appearance. Beſides, how many caſes are there, in which a man of a good and generous diſpoſition, wou'd recede from his right, and neglect his own advantage, that his friend might reap the benefit of it. Neither is the ſecond opinion, which confines friendſhip within an equal and mutual return of good offices, founded upon better grounds than the former; for the taking account of obligations received, and ballancing them with the favours we have beſtow'd, ſeems to be a limiting friendſhip within too narrow a compaſs, and curtailing its properties and excellencies: for in my mind, it ſeems of too gene-

rous and prolific a quality, than to make obſervations of favours, either beſtowed or received, or to be under apprehenſions, leſt an obligation ſhould be forgot, its favours waſted, or more conferr'd, than our friends are able to return: and, as to the third opinion, that we ſhou'd pay the ſame deference to our friends that they have for themſelves, that holds good leſs than either of the other; becauſe there are ſome caſes, in which, by a continual ſeries of misfortunes, men are brought to deſpair, and their minds render'd as abject as their fortunes. In ſuch inſtances therefore, we ought not to proportion our love and good-will towards our friend, to the opinion and reſpect he entertains of himſelf; but rather to endeavour to raiſe his ſinking ſpirits, and from deſpondency, to bring him to hope for a better turn of fate: we muſt therefore conſtitute other limits, within which friendſhip ought to be confined; but firſt I muſt take notice of an aſſertion, to which Scipio cou'd never be reconciled; namely, that we ought not to give too great a looſe to friendſhip, but confine it within ſuch bounds, as always to be prepared for the poſſibility of a rupture. This, in his opinion, was a tenet not only baſe, but prejudicial to friendſhip; and he accordingly, could never be perſwaded that it proceeded from the mouth of Bias, who was accounted one of the ſeven Sages, but rather ſeem'd to be the ſentiments of ſome villain or ambitious knave, who was endeavouring to wreſt the power into his own hands: for, how can I pretend to be a friend to any man, when at the ſame time, I find a poſſibility of being at enmity with him? beſides, at this rate, we ſhall be under a neceſſity of

rejoycing at the falſe ſteps our friend makes, that we may have the more opportunities, and greater pretences of rebuking him; and for the ſame reaſon, muſt we envy our friends good fortune, and be uneaſy at their ſucceſsful management: ſuch ſentiments therefore (whoever is the author of them), not only derogate from the principles of true friendſhip, but utterly deſtroy them too: wherefore, ſuch a doctrine ought not to be inculcated; but we ought rather to uſe ſuch a precaution in the election of our friends, as never to fix our affection upon ſuch, as we have reaſon to ſuppoſe we may hereafter diſlike: But, if it is our misfortune to err ſo far in our choice, Scipio's opinion was rather to endeavour the continuance of our engagements, than ever to admit of the thoughts of a diſagreement.

XVII. Friendſhip therefore, ought to be limited within ſuch bounds, as when once the morals of the two parties are reform'd and regular; there then ſhou'd be ſo perfect a harmony and agreement, both in their deſigns and councils; that, if by any ill turn of fate, the life and reputation of either of them, ſhould be endanger'd from the unjuſt intentions of his friends, in which it is not ſafe to aſſiſt him; in ſuch caſes, (unleſs infamy it ſelf ſhould follow the deſign) friendſhip muſt be ſtretch'd to its utmoſt limits, and demands us to defend our friend; for there muſt be ſome allowance granted to the dignity of friendſhip; but we muſt have ſome regard to reputation too. Nor ought we to ſet light by the love of our country-men, becauſe it is a great inſtrument in the forwarding our under-

takings: and tho' we ought not to make uſe of baſe ends in the attaining of it, yet, on the other hand, virtue when accompanied with love and benevolence, is too great an advantage to be neglected. To return to Scipio, whoſe whole diſcourſe was upon the topic of friendſhip, he wou'd often complain of the vanity of mankind, in taking a ſingular pleaſure in letting company know how rich they were, and how their ſtock of kine, or ſlaves were yearly encreaſed; but not a man of them wou'd reckon up the number of his friends, or take any notice that he had any. He thought it ridiculous to obſerve with what caution men proceeded in the choice of thoſe trifles, tho' at the ſame time they neglected friendſhip, a much more valuable commodity, and took no notice of thoſe characters and marks, by which they might diſtinguiſh a man, that was worthy to be admitted to their breaſt. Let us therefore give the preference to men of a ſteady and conſtant ſoul; tho' there be few ſuch to be found; and, whether a man be endued with ſuch qualities or no, is hard to judge, till we have try'd him: however, the friendſhip we contract with him, will give us a ſpecimen of his qualities, ſo that our intimacy foreſtalls our judgment, and we muſt be his friend, before we have an opportunity of ſounding him. As therefore a skillful charioteer wou'd hardly give a young metalſome horſe the reins, till he hath tried him; ſo neither ſhould a prudent man give friendſhip too great a looſe, nor put too much confidence in the acquaintance, till he is ſure of the man. Some men are ſo ſhallow, that they are won by trifles, and tempted with the gilded bait, expoſe to the

view of mankind their levity and unconſtancy: the ſouls of ſome other men, tho' fortified againſt ſuch weak temptations, are yet not able to hold out againſt the force of ſome more powerful allurement; but could we find any that ſcorn to ſacrifice their friend to their intereſt, yet where ſhall we find the man, that is ſo far proof againſt the glittering temptations of grandeur, wealth, and empire, as, were thoſe engaging advantages to be offer'd him on one hand, and the bleſſings of friendſhip on the other, he wou'd not look with ſcorn and contempt upon the latter, and with joy adhere to the former? for we are all fleſh and blood; and power hath ſomething ſo enticing and ſo dazling belongs to it, that it is no wonder, if frail nature, charm'd with its beauties, is not able at laſt to reſiſt its temptation. Beſides, ſhou'd we by betraying our friend, arrive at the expected pitch of grandeur, we then think we have a plea for our ingratitude, and that thoſe powerful motives that induced us to break our engagements, will excuſe us in the eyes of the world, and draw a curtain over the rupture. True friendſhip therefore is ſeldom to be found among great men and courtiers; for where ſhall we meet with a man that is ſo juſt to his engagements, as to contribute to the advancement or grandeur of his friend, by neglecting his own? but to omit ſuch inſtances, how ſhocking and terrible an aſpect hath friendſhip in adverſity; and where ſhall we find that heroe of a man that dare continue true in our adverſity, and be a friend to our misfortunes? tho' Ennius is certainly in the right of it, when he ſays,

" To fortune's ſmiles, each man a friend will be,
" But let her frown, and then our friends we ſee."

Yet thoſe are circumſtances that give very convincing proofs of the levity and weakneſs of thoſe mens ſouls, who either look down upon their diſtreſſed friends with ſcorn and contempt, from their ſummit of fortune; or as they ſee the clouds gathering together, and threatning their friend with deſtruction, prepare for a ſtorm and ſecure their own perſons, by forſaking him.

XVIII. That man therefore, who neither puffed up with the favours of fortune, or deterred by her frowns, behaves himſelf ſo, as to give proofs in both circumſtances of his conſtant, and firm reſolution; let me tell you, we ought to look upon him as a very extraordinary perſon, and reſpect him as ſomething more than mortal. Now, this ſteadineſs and reſolution, which is ſo neceſſary an ingredient in friendſhip, is founded upon a principle of faithfulneſs; but take that prop away, and the ſuperſtructure immediately totters. Beſides, we ſhould take care to pitch upon a plain, honeſt, well-dealing gentleman, whoſe humour is conformable and agreeable to our own: theſe qualifications are branches which proceed from the ſame root with ſincerity, and it is impoſſible for us to truſt a man of a double and ſhuffling genius; neither is it to be ſuppoſed, that there's any confidence to be put in a temper, that is oppoſite to, and claſhes with their own. Not to be too forward in accuſing our friends, nor too credulous in believing what report may ſay to their diſadvantage, is another qualification which

bears ſome relation likewiſe to fidelity; and ought to be a characteriſtic of that man with whom we intend an intimacy. From whence, as I have hinted before, we may fairly infer, that good men alone are capacitated for enjoying the bleſſings of friendſhip, in which there are two things to be obſerved, which I take to be the eſſential quality of a good and wiſe man: the firſt is ever to deal plainly, and without diſſimulation; for it is more genteel and honourable by half, to tell a man to his face, that we have an averſion for him, than to palliate our diſtaſte under a ſpecies of friendſhip. The ſecond is, not only to defend our friend from the calumny of a ſlanderous tongue, but even not ſo much as to ſuſpect him of double dealing. But the moſt neceſſary ingredient, and what gives a reliſh to the whole, is a peculiar grace and ſweetneſs in our expreſſions, join'd to a courteous and affable behaviour: as for moroſeneſs and ſeverity, it carries ſomething of grandeur and authority in it; but that ought to be laid aſide in friendſhip, and give way to a frank and winning complacency.

XIX. Here ſome people are apt to ſtart a very difficult and odd queſtion, whether or no, we ought to deal by our new friends, if found worthy of our acquaintance, as we do by our horſes, and always give the laſt the preheminence? But this, in my mind, is a query that a man of ſenſe or honeſty wou'd bluſh at; for friendſhip is never ſurfeiting, but like old wine by a long continuance, gains a more agreeable reliſh, and really verifies the old proverb, which adviſes to eat many a peck of ſalt with a man, before we ſettle a

perfect friendſhip with him. A new acquaintance indeed, provided it is promiſing, ought not to be neglected; but then we ought to act nothing in favour of that, which may be any ways a detriment to the old one: for there's great ſtreſs to be laid upon a laſting and old acquaintance. (To mention again the foregoing inſtance), I fancy, we ſhall find very few, who, were there no inconvenience in it, wou'd prefer a young unmanaged horſe, to one that he is uſed to ride on; neither in ſuch caſes only is cuſtom prevalent, but inanimate things too: for we daily ſee people, that have been uſed to woods and mountains, at laſt ſo much admire ſolitude, as not to be dragged from it without reluctancy and regret: but the ſtrongeſt cement to preſerve friendſhip when once united, is for both parties to be upon a level, and neither of them to claim a precedency, that poſſible may be due to their merit. Inſtances of ſuch a difference are frequently to be met with: thus, Scipio's virtue ſhined forth with greater luſtre than any of the whole ſtate, yet he was ſo far from valuing himſelf for his merit, that he never took place of Philius, Rupilius, or Memmius, nor ever put himſelf before his friends, tho' of the meaneſt rank; nay, he was ſo condeſcending, as to pay a peculiar deference to his brother Q. Maximus, purely becauſe he was elder; tho' indeed Q. Maximus was a gentleman that made a very conſiderable figure any where, except in Scipio's preſence; but in that reſpect, Scipio was of a very generous temper, and ever took delight in embelliſhing the characters of his friends and acquaintance with the luſtre of his own merit. So eminent an example we ought to follow;

and if by our virtue, wit or fortune, we have raiſed our ſelves to a degree above our neighbours, we ought to impart, and let them ſhare in the advantage. Thus, were we deſcended from mean parents, and had we friends whoſe underſtanding and eſtates were none of the largeſt, we ought to help them out with our fortunes, and grace their perſons with our credit and authority. So we read in fabulous ſtories of young heroes, who thro' the world's being ignorant of their birth and quality, have been brought up to drudgery and labour; and tho', when they have come to the knowledge of their parents, they have been proved either the off-ſpring of ſome god or emperor; yet they have ſtill retain'd a natural affection and reſpect for their foſter-fathers, whom they ſo long thought their true ones. How much more therefore is ſuch a duty owing to our known and lawful parents? But to ſay no more upon this head, we ſhall find the luſtre of virtue, and all other qualifications never to ſhine ſo bright, as when it diſplays its beams upon its neighbours.

XX. As therefore the more eminent party, when he hath once knit the bond of friendſhip, ought to place himſelf upon a level with his inferior; ſo on the other hand, we ought not to be concern'd becauſe our friends excel us, either in merit, dignity, or fortune, tho' complaints and upbraiding, is almoſt a neceſſary concomitant of inferiority; and the more ſo, when the inferior party thinks he hath reaſon to brag of paſt ſervices; but it is very odious and inſupportable, thus to upbraid us with an obligation, which

the party alone on whom it is conferred, and not he that confers it, ought to acknowledge. Wherefore, it is not enough for a perſon of a greater merit, to humble himſelf; but there's yet a farther duty required of him, and to render himſelf wholly agreeable, he muſt endeavour to raiſe his friend to a higher pitch, than his inferior qualities can pretend to. For there are ſome, who are of ſuch an uneaſy temper, that they leſſen the bleſſings of friendſhip; and pall its reliſh, by fancying themſelves contemptible in the eyes of their friends; tho' this ſeldom happens, unleſs among perſons that are ſenſible of their little worth, and conſcious that they deſerve to be ſlighted; in which caſe, we ſhou'd endeavour to take away the ſuſpicion, elevate their hopes, and perſuade them into a better opinion of their own merit. Now, there are two things to be obſerved in the beſtowing our favours; the firſt is, that we exert our ſelves to the utmoſt of our ability; the ſecond, that we beſtow ſuch favours, as the dignity and merit of our friend can lay claim to. For, were we in never ſo high a ſtation, it would be impoſſible to reward them all alike, or adorn them with the higheſt honours. Thus we ſee the intereſt of Scipio could obtain Pub. Rutilius the conſular dignity, tho' he could not oblige his brother Lucius with the ſame favour. But let us puſh the caſe farther, and ſuppoſe a man had intereſt enough to oblige his friends in any thing; yet even then he muſt not confer his favours promiſcuouſly, nor heap more upon his friend, than his qualifications can pretend to. The temper therefore of the parties muſt be well grounded, and ſettled, before we can judge of the ſincerity of their friendſhip;

neither are thoſe, whom, in our younger days, we choſe as companions in our ſports and diverſions, to be always look'd upon as fit perſons to contract a friendſhip with; for, was that the caſe, our nurſe and ſchoolmaſter, by the right of old acquaintance, might juſtly lay claim to our whole affections: ſome reſpect indeed, is due to them, who firſt had our eſteem and reverence, tho' it cannot come up to that which friendſhip requires; for otherwiſe friendſhip wou'd be founded upon a very unfirm baſis: for a different behaviour is the natural concomitant of different inclinations, which firſt break the ties of friendſhip, and cauſe the rupture. And it is this difference alone, in humour and behaviour, that makes it almoſt impoſſible for any true friendſhip, or real intimacy to be contracted between good and bad men. It is beſides, a very good caution in relation to friendſhip, not to let our love be ſo immoderate, or ill-placed, as to have any thought, that may tend to the prejudice of our friend; for, (to return to fabulous ſtories) had Neoptolemus liſtened to the tears and entreaties of his tutor Lycomedes, he never had been maſter of Troy. There often happen very urgent reaſons to depart from our friends; in which caſe, whoever diſſuades his friend to lay aſide the thoughts of a departure, becauſe he ſhall not be able to bear the loſs of him, ſhews great proof of an effeminate, weak ſoul, and gives us reaſon to ſuppoſe he is more concerned for himſelf than his friend. In all things therefore, we muſt conſider, not only what we ſhould require of our friends, but what, were the caſe our own, we ſhould be willing to grant them.

XXI. It ſometimes happens, that a fatal neceſſity appears to give interruption to friendſhip, and break off correſpondence; I mean thoſe friendſhips, and that correſpondence, which are entertain'd among perſons of a lower quality than wiſe men and philoſophers. This is frequent and common in the world for men to behave themſelves ill, either towards thoſe who were nearly related as friends, or towards thoſe, whom, upon the ſcore of common humanity, they ſhou'd have kept fair and even with, whoſe bad conduct, and ill management, is a reflection upon thoſe they are familiar with. From friendſhips of this nature, and familiars of this diſpoſition, we ſhou'd gradually retire; and agreeable to what I have heard Cato frequently ſay, we ſhou'd prudently diſſolve them, and not violently throw them off at once; except ſome injuſtice that is remarkable, and of a monſtrous ſize, blazons them for villains, ſo that neither probity nor reputation can be preſerved pure in their acquaintance and familiarity; in which caſe we are required to withdraw on a ſudden, and bid adieu to ſuch companions. But ſhould it be (as it is not uncommon) for men to be changeable in their manners and diſpoſitions, or to diſagree in point of politics; (I hint by the way, what I juſt now mention'd of perſons in a common rank, and not of wiſe men and philoſophers) in ſuch a caſe, diſcretion and prudence ſhou'd lead us on, not only to avoid violence in our going off; but even diſſuade us from contracting hatred and animoſities at the rupture: for nothing looks ſo ill, and below a man, as to be at defiance and enmity with him, that was once our acquain-

tance and familiar friend. My friends, ye very well know, Scipio withdrew his correſpondence from Quintus Pompeius for my ſake, and he forbare any longer familiarity with my colleague Metellus, upon ſome different maxims and notions of government: But in both theſe inſtances of diviſion, he acted both the prudent and wiſe man; for he diſſolved the correſpondence without retaining any malignancy of ill-nature or reſentment. The firſt duty and caution for friends, is this, that they take all poſſible care to prevent diſturbance and diſſention; but if ſuch things ſhou'd happen, as is poſſible they may, then they ſhou'd ſo bring it about, that friendſhip ſhou'd leiſurely ſink and die away, and not be extinguiſh'd at once. Prudence and caution ſhou'd always prevent the growth of animoſity and ill-will, when friendſhip and familiarity are laid aſide; from whence, as from a fountain, flow reproach, revilings, and contempt, which, tho' they are very diſagreeable, yet we muſt endeavour to bear with them, and pay ſo much deference to our former ties of friendſhip, as to blame the aggreſſor only, and not him that receives the affront: there is one thing that will guard againſt, and prevent all thoſe evils and diſturbances; that is, neither to take friends upon truſt, nor to chuſe thoſe that have very little to recommend them. He is the only perſon fit for acquaintance and friendſhip, who is endued with ſuch qualities, and has ſo much of worth and dignity in him, as to give mankind a value for his perſon. Perſons of this quality are not many in number; as indeed, all things that are valuable, are ſcarce, and it will be difficult, as well as tedious, to find out the man whom

we may call finiſh'd, and hath nothing of blemiſh and imperfection in him. As for the greater part of the world, they regard and value all things, either to the price they will bring, or the advantage they ſhall get by them; they rate their friends as they do their cattle or effects; what is the moſt ſerviceable, and will bring them moſt money, and pleaſe them beſt, is firſt in their eſteem. Upon which account they are altogether without the bleſſing of that friendſhip which is ſo excellent in its own nature, and for its own ſake ſo deſirable. For from themſelves they have no notion how much is the power and good of friendſhip, becauſe they were always ſtrangers to the practice of it. That every man's affections are fix'd upon himſelf, proceeds not from the gain or intereſt he ſhall make of himſelf, but becauſe ſelf-love and preſervation are natural principles; and without a friend be as a man's ſelf, true friendſhip is impracticable: For the very nature of a friend requires that he be a ſecond ſelf. Now, if in every ſpecies of beings below reaſon, and in every part of the brutal world, there appears, firſt, a natural tendency to ſecure and preſerve its ſelf, and after that, a propenſity to conſort and joyn with animals of the ſame nature; how much more illuſtriouſly ſhould theſe principles of nature diſplay themſelves in the rational world, that are under the conduct of a better guide, not only to love and be kind to themſelves, but find out another perſon of an agreeable ſoul and temper to theirs, and then both unite into one.

XXII. But we are ill-natured, and perverſe to ſuch a height, (not to ſay impudent) that we expect ſuch

good qualities in friends, that we can our ſelves have none of; and demand more, and greater things, than either ourſelves are either able or willing to perform. What is reaſonable and fair, is this, that a man ſhould firſt be himſelf good, and then ſeek out a companion of the ſame ſtamp and quality: And then, indeed, the friendſhip that is contracted between ſuch perſons, will have that firmneſs and ſtability we have been diſcourſing about. Now, when men unite by complacency and good nature, they will command and keep under thoſe paſſions that others are ſubſervient and ſlaves to; they will manage, and be govern'd by juſtice, and undertake any thing that may do each other good; and withal, their demands will be reaſonable and fair, and they will put nothing upon each other, that contradicts honeſty or ſincerity: ſo that there will not only be an interchange of love and affection, but they will pay a deference and reſpect to one another. For friendſhip loſes its comelineſs and grace, when modeſty and decorum are wanting. Therefore thoſe perſons are very much in the wrong, and groſsly miſtaken, who are of opinion, that friendſhip gives licence to the practice of any thing unſeemly or lewd. Friendſhip was always intended by nature, to go hand in hand with virtue, but never to be made a companion in guilt; that whereas the powers of virtue in one ſingle perſon, are not able to reach and attain things that are in their nature ſublime, they may be come at, by union and conjunction with another: and among what perſons ſuch an agreement and ſympathy has ever been, is maintain'd, or ſhall ſpring up; that converſation and commerce is the

very firſt happineſs and bleſſing of human nature. This, I affirm, is that converſation and ſociety in which are contained all thoſe things that men think valuable, and therefore deſirable, and worthy of purſuit to render themſelves happy and eaſy, becauſe without them they cannot be ſo; ſuch as honeſty, a good name, peace, and pleaſure within. Now, if our deſires are after what is really good, and a true bleſſing; our endeavours muſt be to practiſe virtue, and let that be the end of our actions; for without it, we can neither attain the happineſs of friendſhip, or the bleſſing of any thing elſe. And whenever we bid farewell to virtue, we ſhall find ourſelves miſtaken in our accounts, in reckoning upon a number of friends, which any misfortune that calls for their aſſiſtance, will demonſtrate we had not. For a very good reaſon then, this is an admonition that can never be too often reminded us, that we learn what men are, before we admit them to be friends, and not unite our affections to them firſt, and afterwards ſee into their value and worth. Negligence and diſ-regard throws us into many misfortunes and inconveniences; but more particularly, betrays us into them in the buſineſs of friendſhip, and correſpondence with mankind. We manage abſurdly, and continue to play the fool, which the proverb has caution'd us againſt; when on a ſudden, by the appearance of ſome miſunderſtanding, we throw off that friendſhip, which ſeem'd to be eſtabliſhed by the mutual endearments, and reciprocal offices of benevolence.

XXIII. Upon which account then, to be negligent and regardleſs in an affair of ſuch moment and conſequence, is a fault wholly inexcuſable; for there is no one thing in human concerns, that the voice of the world is ſo general to call a bleſſing, as friendſhip. Virtue itſelf hath not the approbation of all men; for there are thoſe in the world, and not a few, who call it nothing but vanity and oſtentation. Riches and mighty affluence have no reliſh, and go down but ill with thoſe, who are content with the leſſer gifts of fortune; and whom a moderate and eaſy competency pleaſes and delights. Honour, the idol and deſire of numerous crowds, is deſpiſed and contemned by others, in whoſe account and ſentiments, it paſſes for nothing above trifles and inſignificancy. As for other things, it is the very ſame with them; what ſome love with paſſion, purſue with eagerneſs, and give the name and character of excellent and valuable to; others regard them no more than things not worth looking after, or ſpending any thought or time about. But as for the dignity and worth of friendſhip, all men joyn in a common conſent, as well thoſe whoſe buſineſs and employments are the concerns of the public, as thoſe who are buſy in the purſuit of knowledge, and in the improvement of their intellectual faculties; and alſo thoſe who ſeparated from the hurry of the world, are concern'd only in what relates to themſelves: and laſt of all, even men of pleaſure, whoſe higheſt aims are to gratifie their appetites, confeſs and acknowledge an inſeparable neceſſity of friendſhip to carry on the pleaſures of life, and render themſelves

tolerably happy. Friendſhip, by ſome means or other, gets into every ſtate and condition of life; and indeed, there is no poſſibility of living without it: ſhould it happen now, that another Timon of Athens made his appearance, plentifully furniſhed with ill-nature and reſentment againſt converſation, and mankind, he himſelf could not endure to be entirely alone; but would deſire and ſeek out a companion, to whom he might vent his ſpleen, and diſcloſe the malignity of his indignation. But, for a further and infallible conviction in this matter, let us imagine, the gods ſhould ſeparate us from all correſpondence and familiarity with the ſociable world, and confine us to retirement and ſolitude; yet, in this ſtate, offer'd us all the conveniences of nature, and what is agreeable for the pleaſures of life; but, I ſay, had entirely removed us from the power and poſſibility of ſeeing man, the image of our ſelves; where is the man, ſo indolent and inſenſible, that could be eaſy under theſe circumſtances of being, and wear away his life agreeably; from whom ſolitude wou'd not take away his taſte, ſpoil his pleaſure, and pall every gratification affluence can give? that is moſt infallibly true, which Archytas the Tarentine uſed frequently to ſay to the world; and if I remember right, have been informed of it by old men of this age, who received it from thoſe of another: that ſhould any mortal aſcend to the higher regions of the univerſe, be informed of the beauty of its frame and conſtitution, and be alſo made acquainted with the nature and elegancy of heavenly bodies, he would loſe all the pleaſure of the entertainment, for want of a compani-

on to communicate what he had ſeen, which otherwiſe would have greatly raiſed and encreaſed his ſatisfaction. So, upon the whole, nature diſapproves of ſolitude and retirement, and endeavours after ſociety and converſe, which is the more pleaſant and agreeable, the more friendly it is.

XXIV. When nature gives us ſo many fair indications, and points out to us ſo very intelligibly, what ſhe would have, aims at, and covets; we are void of ſenſe and untowardly ſtupid, not to regard thoſe things, or mind what ſhe ſo plainly informs us of. To proceed then, friendſhip has a large field to exerciſe its ſelf in, and variety of occurrences happen for its operation; ſuch as jealouſies, ſurmiſes, and miſunderſtandings, which is the buſineſs and duty of a wiſe man to prevent, and make the beſt of them he can; for thoſe are ſtumbling-blocks that muſt be taken out of the way, leſt they put a ſtop to truth and ſincerity, thoſe incomparable qualifications in a genuine friendſhip. It becomes neceſſary and expedient, often to take our friends to task, deal plainly with them, and charge home our reproofs; and nothing of this ſort ought to give riſe to ill-nature, or paſſion, when they are meant friendly, and intended well. I am at a loſs to find out how that is true which my friend and familiar, Terence, has, in his Andria, aſſerted,

" Truth and plain-dealing do the world offend,
" Whilſt fawning pleaſes, and acquires the friend.

Truth, I confeſs, gives uneaſineſs when it raiſes indig-

nation and hatred, the poiſon and deſtruction of friendſhip; but then flattery and fawning are much more inſupportable, which are afraid to ſhow a man his faults, and permit his friend to drive on till he is ruin'd. It is granted, that man is more culpable and faulty who turns a deaf ear to the truth, and lets obſequiouſneſs, and a crowd of paraſites caſt a miſt before his eyes. Therefore, in affairs of ſo nice a nature, reaſon and care ſhould be the guide: firſt, that admonitions and advices be not joyn'd with bitter invectives; and that rebuke and reproof be not delivered with an air of contempt and diſdain. In obſequiouſneſs to our friends (becauſe I wou'd uſe Terence's expreſſion) complacency and ſweetneſs of temper ſhou'd be joyned with it: but flattery, that pimp to vice, ſhould be entirely removed and abandon'd; which is neither agreeable to the nature of a friend, nor worthy the character and diſtinction of a gentleman. There is a great deal of difference betwixt the buſineſs of a court paraſite, and the office of a friend. When a man has ſtopped, and ſeal'd up his ears againſt all reproof and the truth; ſo that it is out of his power to hear what his friend has to ſay to him, though it carries reaſon and truth along with it; ſuch a man's condition is deplorable indeed. This is a remarkable and excellent ſaying among the many of Cato's, that a man is more beholden and indebted to his moſt inveterate and ſpiteful enemies, than to his friends and familiars, becauſe thoſe have taken the freedom to ſpeak plainly to him, while the others always avoid it. Now this is very abſurd and out of the way, for men that are reproved by their friend, ſo

to miſtake themſelves, as to be uneaſy, and take it ill, which they ought not, yet take no notice of that which ought to affect them. That they are guilty, is no manner of concern to them, but the reproof of their friend is what they cannot endure; which ought to be the contrary, they ſhould be aſham'd and affected for their folly, and be pleaſed with the kind admonitions of their friends.

XXV. But then, as a frank and ready diſpoſition to adviſe our friends, and a ſubmiſſive and calm reſignation to their ſuperior judgment, are ſure characteriſtics of a true and genuine friendſhip; ſo on the other hand, the greateſt bane, and the moſt effectual means to diſſolve its union, is, flattery, fawning, and adulation; for this fault is branded with many terms and appellations, tho' it is peculiar to none but light coxcombs, or deceitful villains, who, without having any regard to truth and honeſty, make their own fancy the ſcope and end of their diſcourſe. Now, as diſſimulation on all accounts, and even in matters of the ſmalleſt moment, deſerves our blame and diſlike, becauſe it vitiates, and is inconſiſtent with truth; ſo is it more eſpecially repugnant to friendſhip, becauſe whenever we put on the mask, and play the hypocrite, we are forced to ſhake hands with ſincerity and honeſty, which add ſo much authority and weight to it. For, if the eſſence of friendſhip conſiſts in uniting two different ſouls; how can we ſuppoſe ſuch an union, when even the ſingle individual ſoul of one of the parties is ſo far from being conſiſtent with its ſelf, or of a piece, that Proteus-like, it is ever mutable and

changing? For what can be more fickle or like a weather-cock, than a fellow who not only conforms his ſentiments and opinions, but his very looks and geſture to thoſe of his cully? if he denies it, it can never be, ſays he; doth he affirm it? he replies, it is ſo. In ſhort, like Gnatho in the play, he makes a reſolution ever to fall into the opinion of the man he gets by; and upon what a hopeful foundation ſuch a friendſhip muſt be grounded, is not very hard to determine. Beſides, there are a ſort of Gnatho's of a ſuperior quality, that are much more unſupportable; who becauſe authority is added to their vanity and flattering, therefore think their eſtate, quality, or reputation, will give them a privilege for their folly. But a genuine and true friend, is as eaſily diſtinguiſhed from a falſe and pretended one, as paint and varniſh from the natural beauties of a lovely face. An aſſembly of cits, tho' compoſed of none of the wiſeſt heads, ſhall eaſily diſtinguiſh between a popular ſelf-deſigning, ſeditious knave, and a ſtanch and true patriot. How cunningly did C. Paperius the other day tickle the ears of the audience, when he propoſed a law, to impower the tribunes of the people to ſtand candidates for the ſame office ſucceſſively from time to time? I oppoſed it, though out of deference and reſpect to Scipio, I muſt, at preſent, ſay nothing of my ſelf, but give him the pre-eminence: Ye Gods! how graceful and pithy was the oration he made upon that occaſion; which plainly ſhow'd him the chief, rather than a member of the Roman ſtate: but I need ſay no more in praiſe of it; for you your ſelves were preſent at the ſpeaking of it, and I believe too, have it by you: the effect of it

was, as you know, the rejecting of the bill, even by the commons themſelves. But to make mention of my ſelf, you may remember how acceptable to the people the law was, that C. Licinius Craſſus made in the conſulſhip of Quintus Maximus, Scipio's brother, and Lucius Mancinus; which law took the power of electing their own fellows from the hands of the college, and transfer'd it intirely unto the people: and indeed, he was the firſt that ever, in public Comitia's, ſided with them: but thro' the religion of the gods, the juſtneſs of the cauſe, and my aſſiſtance, that popular and mercenary harangue fell ſhort of its deſired effect. This happen'd in my Praetorſhip, five years before I was conſul; wherefore it was plain, that the ſucceſs of the cauſe was owing to the juſtneſs of it, rather than to the intereſt and authority of its defender.

XXVI. Now, if ſincerity and truth have ſo much prevalence and power, even when they appear upon the ſtage, or at the bar (places moſt adapted to harangue and fiction); how great and valuable are they in friendſhip, which hath neither worth or ſignificancy without them, they being the very hinge on which it turns, and the foundation it ſtands upon? wherefore, except this be the caſe, that one friend hath a free paſſage (as it were) into the other's ſoul, there can be no aſſurance or ſecurity on either ſide; nor till this be done, can it be diſcover'd whether the paſſion is reciprocal, or the love, that flames in each other's breaſt, pure and ſincere. Altho' flattery or fawning are dangerous, and of very ill conſequence, yet they can prejudice, or bring evil upon no man, but him that is delighted with, and takes a ſatisfaction in them.

'Tis common and natural, for the man, that is fond of himſelf, proud of his own abilities, and in love with his own perſon, to have his ears open and attentive to whatever any nauſeous flatterer ſhall ring in them. Virtue is enamoured, and highly delighted with herſelf; for ſhe is very well acquainted with her own worth and dignity, and perfectly underſtands how amiable ſhe is. Virtue, in reality and truth, is not my preſent buſineſs; but that which conſiſts in opinion and outſide, and would paſs for what is genuine. For, it is the general aim and intention of mankind, rather to be thought virtuous, and ſeem worthy of that character, than endeavour in earneſt to be ſo. Flattery and fine words give infinite pleaſure to theſe; and when the world talks of them according to their wiſh, they imagine every thing true that is ſaid of them, and take it to be a juſt encomium due to their qualities and merit. Therefore there is nothing of friendſhip here; where the one is unwilling to hear things as they really are, and the other has engaged himſelf to ſmother the truth. Flattery would be odious even upon the ſtage its ſelf did it not ſupport the character of a bragging Gnatho. Very good, ſays the ranter, had the lady any ſenſe of the favours? ſhe had, would have ſatisfied the bully; but he adds, Sir, ſhe was obliged to the higheſt degree, and was inexpreſſively grateful for the preſent. This is very agreeable to the nature of paraſites and flatterers who do more than conform themſelves to the expectation of their cullies, by ever magnifying things to them, and repreſenting them bigger than they really are: wherefore, tho' men, who court and careſs adulation and praiſe, without

thought or reflection, take down full draughts of them; yet it may not be amiſs to give a caution to the wiſe and diſcerning part of the world, to be always upon their guard, and examine things thoroughly, leſt they be carried into a liking of the ſame vanity. He muſt be blind and ſtupid indeed, that cannot be aware of flattery, when it is groſs and apparent; but care and regard become neceſſary againſt ſly and inſinuating fawners, that way-lay us, and act under covert. There is a great deal of difficulty in finding out the impoſtor, who ſometimes conceals his flattery under a ſhew of oppoſition, lets it get the upper-hand of the argument; at laſt ſuffers himſelf to be nonpluſs'd, and gives up the cauſe, that the cully may fancy himſelf the better man of the two: But who can bear to be chous'd? wherefore we ought to guard our ſelves againſt it; as in the play, an old man cries out, why ſhould you pick me out from the reſt of the old fools, to make a cully of? For this, even in plays, is the part that is acted by old credulous ſilly dotards.

XXVII. But I am ſurprized to find, how inſenſibly I am gone off from talking of the nature of that friendſhip which is between perſons of perfect wiſdom, (I mean perſons ſo finiſh'd in that excellency, as the weakneſs and infirmity of human nature will admit) to the correſpondencies and familiarities of impertinents and coxcombs. Wherefore let us return to our firſt purpoſe and deſign, and withal, draw to a concluſion. It is virtue, (my friends) I ſay, it is virtue that firſt forms and eſtabliſhes friendſhip, and afterwards continues and preſerves the being of it; for in

that there is every thing convenient and conducive; in that is placed its very foundation and ſupport. Now, whenever virtue diſplays herſelf in a beautiful appearance, and both finds and meets herſelf in another perſon: ſhe makes her advances to it, and unites firmly with it: From which union and conjunction proceeds, what we call by the names of love and friendſhip; for they derive their original from the ſame word, that is, from *Amare, to love:* now, *Amare*, in its natural and proper ſignification, imports, the ſtanding affected for, or loving a perſon, without any thought of ſerving our ſelves, or making any advantage thereby: And indeed, wherever a friendſhip of this nature is cultivated, all thoſe advantages are the conſequences and attendants of it, though they be not enquired after. Upon this foundation was my love and eſteem fix'd in my younger days, for thoſe perſons of a more venerable and advanced age: namely, Lucius Paulus, Marcus Cato, Caius Gallius, Publius Naſica, and Tiberius Gracchus, that was father-in-law to my very good friend Scipio. But a friendſhip of this quality more powerfully, and more exquiſitely appears between correſpondents of the ſame level and equality, as remarkably did between Scipio and myſelf; not excluding Lucius Furius, Publius Rupilius, and Spurius Mummius. And now, having changed my years, and grown pretty forward in life, I am delighted and gratified in the complacency and friendſhip, that is carried on and maintained between myſelf and my juniors; and eſpecially between you, gentlemen, and Quintus Tubero: And I can't help mentioning, how much I am pleaſed and taken in the

converſation and familiarity of Publius Rutilius, and Aulus Virgilius, familiars that are young indeed. But, upon this ſcore, becauſe ſuch is the condition and ſtate of human nature, that one age and generation conſtantly ſucceeds and treads upon the heels of another; a man more heartily wiſhes and deſires to go along and keep pace with thoſe he ſets out with unto the end of the ſtage. But give me leave to ſay, ſince there is ſo much of uncertainty and weakneſs in nature, we ſhould ſeek out thoſe perſons, and that acquaintance, we can firmly joyn our affections to, and that will alſo entertain a mutual love for us. For, if friendſhip, tenderneſs, and benevolence be wanting, we loſe all true pleaſure of being. Scipio, it is very well known, retired from the world, and made a ſudden exit; yet he continues to live, and ſhall never die: For I lov'd and admir'd the virtues and good qualities of him, which will ever live, and have a place in my ſoul: moreover, it is not I alone that was well acquainted with his virtue, who ſhall be happy thereby: No, it will continue to poſterity, ſhine bright in after ages, and look well in diſtant futurity: And to make this good, there will not be found the man that ſhall undertake any thing uncommon or great, but Scipio ſhall be all with him; the remembrance of that great man will puſh him forward, and his example ſtand a rule for his imitation. As for my part, I make an ingenuous confeſſion, that whatever bleſſings I enjoy either from nature, or in my condition of life, are not to be compared with the bleſſing and happineſs I had in Scipio's friendſhip. From the benefit of this, we agreed in every buſineſs of life, whether political or private; and from the benefit of this, we ſpent our leiſure

hours in the ſweet enjoyment of each other. I never (to my knowledge) offended, or gave him diſtaſte in any thing; neither did I ever hear from him, what I wiſh'd had not eſcap'd him; one common place of abode, one table, and the ſame entertainment, provided for us both; whether at the head of the army, or travelling, or retired to our country-houſes, we were inſeparable. I ſilently paſs by the many hours we have ſpent together in our ſtudies, in converſing with works of philoſophers, and men of learning, whenever we got rid of the world, and were free from hurry and importunacy. And were it granted, that the remembrance of theſe things might be extinguiſh'd when Scipio died; yet love, and deſire for ſo valuable a perſon, would always have been lodg'd in my breaſt, and the man I ſhould never have forgot. However, nothing that ever paſt betwixt us is loſt, for conſtancy of reflection ſinks them deeper, and improves them to a better advantage. And had I none of theſe things reflect upon, the thoughts of my age would relieve me; from which I have the aſſurance, that I ſhall not long be abſent from my friend, and dwell only in remembrance of him: all afflictions, though ſevere and ſharp, yet from the ſhortneſs of their continuance, loſe their ſting, and ſo become tolerable. And this is all that I had to deliver upon the ſubject of friendſhip: and ſhall diſmiſs you with this admonition, that ſince friendſhip can have no being without virtue, you would always eſteem, and give the precedency to virtue, as the moſt valuable thing in nature; and then look upon friendſhip in the next place, as the choiceſt and greateſt bleſſing of life.

FINIS.